Hg Recoveries Pty Ltd
A Member of the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership
Partnership Areas: Mercury in Gold Mining, Mercury
Supply and Storage, Mercury Air Transport and Fate, Mercury in Products.
Heavy Metal Specialists
(ABN 87 144 752 885)
(ACN 144 752 885)
Date: 11/12/2014
File: 7754
Mr Chris Buckingham,
Acting Executive Director Regional
Services, Environment Protection Authority
Victoria.
Dear Mr Buckingham,
Thank you for your email at 10.38 am on
Monday the 8th of December.
It is clear from your email that you
haven’t been fully briefed by your Bendigo staff on the antecedents to the
Costerfield issues. Let me take this opportunity to bring you up to date:
1. COSTERFIELD MINE REGULATORY ISSUES
1.1 Attached
is a copy of the Mandalay Resources Q3 2014 ERC minutes. Your Mr Scott Pigdon
was physically present at this meeting.
1.2 If
you view Section 5 bullet point 16 on page 4 you will notice the comment, “Dust
suppression at Splitters Creek has used storm water from the Brunswick tailings
dam”.
1.3 If
you then view page 5 to the section entitled “Splitters Creek Evaporation
facility” you will notice that 0.5 Ml/day (~500,000 liters or 500 tons) of
“water” was being used daily to control dust and a water truck was being used
on the public access road to distribute this water.
1.4 Mr Leask noticed that this
water was being sprayed on the road outside Lot 1 Graytown South Costerfield opposite to the gateway of the
Lazorovski property and the entrance to the Mandalay Resources Splitters Creek “evaporation”
facility. Mr Gilbert Cochrane, Mr Vincent Cochrane and the late Mr James Cochrane noticed the strong odor of this water. It was very clear from
these observations that this was neither town water nor even rainwater.
1.5 It was noted that the Chinese scrub and small suckers on the side of this road had died within 3 days.
1.7 This
same “water” was also observed to be running from Lot 2 into the culvert under
the roadway leading into the Leask property.
1.8 Mr
Leask managed to get an actual sample of the “water” from the truck’s spray bar
and also from the culvert now carrying this “surplus water” onto his farm.
1.9 These
same samples were sent to Envirolab in Scoresby under ‘a chain of custody’ and
the results were available on the 24th of November 2014.
1.10 The
data was provided to DSDBI (John Mitas and Kylie White) and EPA (Tony Robinson EPA contact person for Costerfield) on the 25th of November 2014.
1.11 From
the analysis of the “water” being dumped onto the roadway opposite the Lazorovski property it is very clear that this “water” is in fact groundwater
extracted from the underground workings of the mine and is in fact (as has been
admitted by the mines ‘independent’ consultants) Category “A” Prescribed
Industrial Waste”. This water has an
antimony concentration that is 7,666
times the ADWGL.
1.12 As an important aside, I notice that the EPA issued a press release on the 8th of December 2014
regarding contamination of waterways in the Dandenong area. I
note that the metals of concern for EPA were barium, lead, copper and zinc.
1.13 The
water being sprayed onto the road during this incident in Costerfield contained
the following elements:
Element
|
Concentration ug/L
|
ADWGL ug/L
|
Exceedance of ADWGL
|
Analysed at Dandenong
|
Antimony
|
23,000
|
3
|
7,666 times
|
No
|
Arsenic
|
170
|
10
|
17 times
|
No
|
Boron
|
260
|
4000
|
No
|
|
Barium
|
86
|
2000
|
Yes
|
|
Cadmium
|
0.2
|
2
|
No
|
|
Copper
|
5
|
2000
|
Yes
|
|
Cobalt
|
3
|
0
|
No
|
|
Manganese
|
76
|
500
|
No
|
|
Nickel
|
11
|
20
|
No
|
|
Lead
|
< 1
|
10
|
Yes
|
|
Zinc
|
10
|
0
|
Yes
|
This “water” that was sprayed onto the
roadway has a toxic Metal Hazard Index
of 223.3. In the Hazard Index procedure; a rating of 1 raises a flag and a
rating of 10 requires urgent remedial action.
Upon reviewing the above toxic elements concentrations present in this
water it is no wonder animals are dying on the Leask farm.
1.14 It
is of most concern that the EPA can assemble a team involving Dandenong
Council, EPA investigators and the Centre for Aquatic Pollution Identification
(CAPIM) to investigate elements with relatively high groundwater investigation concentrations present in the storm water drains of
Dandenong but has failed to assemble a similar team or to carry out testing for
the far more highly toxic elements that are present at Costerfield. I am sure it is somewhat galling for the
Costerfield residents to see an EPA Press Release for the “Dandenong”
investigation but at Costerfield, all the EPA is doing is intimidating one of the complainants!
1.15 At
2.15pm on the 27th of November 2014, Mr Danny Childs from the
EPA made an inspection report (Serial 80008104) on the farm composting site of
Mr Leask.
1.16 Page 1 of the “Inspection
report” is flawed because it states “Unlicensed premises” and “Farm”.
1.17 The
site does not have a capacity to process more than 100 tons of waste per month
and thus is not a Scheduled
Composting Site according to the Environment Protection (Scheduled Premises and Exemptions) Regulations 2007.
1.18 If
Mr Childs had bothered to search the EPA Website he would have noted that there
are no documents on the web site relating to
Farm composting.
1.19 Mr
Childs noted in his inspection report that there was a windrow turner on the
site and thus this farm composting site is an aerobic composting site.
1.20 The
composting site is in Strathbogie Shire and there is no requirement for
composting operations on this site to be licensed.
1.21 I
point you to Section 1I of the EPA Act 1970 “Principles of wastes hierarchy”
Clause (b) re-use of wastes and (c) re-cycling.
1.22 Mr Leask is complying with the
EPA principles enshrined in the EPA Act.
1.23 Mr Leask has carried out
composting operations since the late 1960s.
1.24 This
site is on high ground to the east of the Splitters Creek facility on a poorly
maintained little used roadway.
1.25 If
Mr Childs was responding to the issue of the water being sprayed on the roadway
(I doubt the EPA has enough funds to pay an officer to drive around country
roads looking for aerobic composting sites) then the question needs to be asked
why he would cross over a creek and drive in an easterly direction when the
objective of his sampling was a 1.7 kilometers to the west.
1.26 Despite
numerous complaints about dust and water coming from the Splitters Creek
construction site onto the Leask property, the EPA has not attended the site to
view the pollution coming from the under
construction evaporation facility – if the EPA had attended then this
evaporation facility site would have been shut down.
1.27. Mr
Childs had a clear and unambiguous duty of care to make diligent enquiries to
inform himself of the legalities surrounding on farm composting in Victoria
before he issued formal notices under the EPA Act. Mr Childs failed in all of
these duties.
1.28 Either
Mr Childs has not been properly trained in his duties by the EPA or his actions
were a deliberate act under instruction from his superiors to intimidate Mr
Leask.
1.29 The
timing of the visit, the reports sent to Mr Leask and the response timing
indicate that his (Mr Child’s) actions could only be construed as ‘designed to
intimidate Mr Leask’.
1.30 A
correctly trained and supervised
officer would have understood the law as it stands in Victoria, would have made
enquiries from the relevant Shire regarding actual applicable permitting
requirements, checked the EPA website for controls on farm composting prior to
issuing factually flawed statutory documents and then making false allegations
of illegal activity as a consequence.
1.31 A
competent tribunal may well form the view that the actions of Mr Childs and his
immediate supervisor could be construed as misconduct.
2.
Impacts of the Splitters Creek development on the Leask and
other local farms.
2.1
The Leask family have owned the Splitters
Creek site for 66 years and Mr Leask and his partner Pamela King operate what
was a highly successful chemical free farming operation.
2.2
Mr Leask and Ms King objected to the
Splitters Creek development at VCAT and VCAT applied 9 pages totalling 29 conditions on
the development; conditions that were flowed down to the Bendigo Council planning permit issued on the 20th of June 2014.
2.3
The permit required, prior to commencement
of construction work, the appointment of an authorised environmental auditor
under the EPA Act 1970.
2.4
Work commenced on the site without any
evidence that this auditor had been legally appointed. Can you provide a copy of the 53ZB notifications from the appointed
auditor?
2.5
There is no evidence that prior to the
commencement of works (Clause 7(a) of the COGB permit was ever issued.
2.6
There is no evidence that Clause 14 of the
COGB permit has ever been complied with.
2.7
Testing carried out by the Commonwealth National Measurement Institute (NMI) has demonstrated that a lamb selected at
random on the Leask farm had been highly contaminated with antimony, arsenic,
cadmium and lead. The liver had a Hazard Index (HI) of 36.49 and the kidney had
a HI of 32.95
2.8
Lambing percentages on the Leask farm, like
other farms in this area, have collapsed since the introduction of a new
crusher at the mine in 2013. The Leask farm has suffered sudden and previously unknown stock deaths and still
births of highly valuable sheep and horses.
2.9
Since work started on the Splitters Creek development, the Leask farm has been heavily impacted by dust and toxic water
run off from the site.
2.10
Noise levels have consistently been well
above approved EPA allowances. The Leask farm has lodged many complaints and
despite being given reference numbers for these complaints, has not received
any response from the EPA, what so ever.
2.11
It has recently come to the notice of the
residents the mine is proposing to use the Category A waste water from the mine to “condition” the clay at the Splitters Creek site. This clay is to be used to
construct the evaporation terraces and the storage dam. The concern is that
this water will contaminate the soil below the terraces and the dam and will
prevent any leakage of this Category A waste from the terraces from being identified
in the future - the mine will always claim it is just contamination from the
clay “conditioning”.
2.12
There is no
permit condition that allows the Category A prescribed Industrial Waste water
from the mine to be used to “condition” the construction clay.
2.13
Both Mr Leask and Ms King are deeply
traumatized by the events that have unfolded since the construction of this
evaporation facility has commenced. Their farm has been heavily polluted and
many of their customers have been lost. The indications are that the farm has,
as a direct consequence, lost at least 50% of its value. They cannot now get bees to pollinate their annual grasses as the bee keeper had to remove his hives away from this property due to the extreme pollution risk to the honey.
2.14
Bendigo Council continually ignores
complaints of nuisance under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act; Worksafe is
conducting an investigation of the offsite impacts of the mine but recently had
to seek from the complainant an extension of time for this investigation.
2.15
There is clearly an issue either with the
competency of Mr Pigdon or he has been subject to regulatory capture.
2.16
If you review page 7 of the ERC minutes
dated 6th of November, in the section headed “Air Quality”.
C “Dust levels were below EPA
prescribed limits at all monitoring sites with the exception of one site CD10
in September with high total insoluble matter but low ash content suggesting
the presence of high organic matter. Field notes recorded bugs observed in
bottles. This would suggest that the mine does not have any dust issues.”
2.17
You cannot have a high insolubles content
which is predominantly inorganic (mostly metal oxides including silicon) and a
low ash figure IN THE SAME SAMPLE because the insolubles are generally
derived/determined from the total ash residue content so this point is in all
probability wrong and misleading. This
mine needs to reference the particular lab methods (and produce the documents)
for determining insoluble fractions.
2.18
In any ash sample there will be virtually
zero residues derived from any organic substances present in the un-ashed
sample BECAUSE IT IS VIRTUALLY ALL BURNED OFF LEAVING LITTLE OR NO RESIDUE IN
THE ASH DURING THE ASHING PROCESS.
2.19
Given the statement made in Bullet point 1
(under air quality) this person then cannot make the assumptions he is trying
to about “being due to organic matter in the sample” prior to ashing, or
extending this confused comment as support
for his false conclusion, “that no DUST problem exists”!
2.20
It is true that any organics (having no
intrinsic metals content in the organic matrix) will leave no consequential or
detectable ash residue AFTER being burned (ashed). The conclusion arrived at by
the high insolubles – low ash statement is therefore incongruous, aka INCORRECT
– his conclusion is NOT SUPPORTED by his incorrect assumption(s).
2.21
If you have a high insolubles content IN THE
ASH this is almost entirely made up from non-soluble, non-volatile inorganic
metal oxides including any silica that might also be present in the original
sample; ie., just what you would expect to see when you ash a sample that
contains mine crusher fines dust!
The insoluble ash fraction would not,
therefore, contain any volatile species known to be present in this
environment, e.g., mercury and arsenic either, since these substances would be
flashed off and lost during the ashing phase of the analytical process.
2.22
The mine has never monitored its dust emission according to the requirements laid down by EPA for a Level 1 mine. Mr
Pigdon knows this, so he should have objected to the claim that dust was “below
EPA prescribed limits”.
2.23
Mr Pigdon should have corrected the mine’s
statement regarding “low ash content and high organic matter”, because not only is his statement not supported
by the actual analytical results, it is simply not correct and therefore could
be considered fraudulent.
2.24
There has never been any dust monitoring that complies with the Mining SEPP. EPA have been derelict in their duties by
failing to enforce the installation of compliant equipment and also by allowing
the mine to engage in deceptive and misleading conduct during the ERC meeting.
2.25
Can the EPA
please provide a representative at the next ERC meeting that actually
understands the issues surrounding these type of mining processes.
2.26
EPA has a major issue with the Category A
Prescribed waste that was sourced from the Costerfield mine, which was being
dumped into Hirds Pit in Heathcote under an EPA Emergency PAN.
2.27
A little more than half of the waste water
transported from the Costerfield mine to Hirds Pit in Heathcote has now been
lost to the environment, mostly (it is believed) through underlying faults and
cracks in the geological structures beneath this pit. Here, it is important to
note that the normal rate of evaporation
at the pit does not account for these losses. At the current rate of
discharge this pit will return to the historic pre-PAN levels within two years.
EPA must therefore urgently recommend the installation of a suitable plant at
this pit to reprocess the waste and return clean water to the environment. The SKM report (5MB pdf) identified McIvor Creek, which runs through the centre of Heathcote,
as the potential sink for the discharge and our testing earlier in the year
indicates that this was already occurring.
2.28
EPA should now approach the new Minister as
a matter of urgency and seek funding to fix this issue.
SUMMARY
Bendigo Council has already had its first
request for rate revaluation and can expect a large number of further
claims. With the vast volumes of
Category A Prescribed waste leaking from the Heathcote pit there will, no
doubt, be a large number of similar claims in the Heathcote area. The long term
impact on Bendigo Council revenues will be significant.
For the farmers the impacts are much
greater, as the very significant drop in farm valuations will for many farmers
in the area trigger lending criteria reviews by their lending banks, and some
of the bigger farmers may well be seen as actually or technically insolvent.
The above scenario will trigger a large
number of compensation claims under Part 8, Section 85 of the Mineral Resources
Sustainable Development Act (MRSDA Act). The quantum of these claims will
clearly tip the mine into insolvency and hence the statutory compensation will
not be paid unless a claim can be made against the Canadian owners and
Shareholders; I am advised that international agreements do allow this for type
of claim.
If the mine becomes insolvent, then the
State of Victoria will wind up with the remediation liability for both the
Costerfield and Heathcote sites.
EPA has consistently adopted a wait and
assess process for the toxic waste in Hirds pit in Heathcote - the current
process outlined by the EPA will mean that the pit is empty before an decision
is made as to how the water in the pit is going to be made safe. A more cynical
commentator would call this process “willful blindness”.
Mr Buckingham, the time has come for you to
demonstrate that the EPA can take the lead on environmental remediation and
control issues! I am certain your new Minister
for the Environment will be following up
on these issues at Costerfield with great interest.
I look forward to your prompt and detailed
response.
Sincerely
Andrew Helps
Managing Director
And that response arrived... and Mr Helps has responded to it here.
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